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Abstract—Ransomware is a form of extortion in which
digital files are rendered inaccessible until a ransom
payment is made. Modern ransomware emerged in 2006
and its destructive influence has been expanding ever
since. In recent years cybercriminals have evolved who
they target, what computer systems they target, and how
they infect those systems. Meanwhile, cybersecurity
experts have modelled ransomware methods allowing
them to innovate their defense techniques across three
paradigms: recovery, detection, and prevention.
Ultimately either ransomware attackers or ransomware
defenders will dominate this ongoing conflict. A review
of the literature indicates that the ransomware crime
wave will likely be mitigated in the coming decades as
security tools improve, users become more aware of the
threat, and governmental entities step in to enforce
punishments.

difficult to be profitable, or security will be too difficult to
be feasible.
The purpose of this literature review is to examine the
techniques that have emerged in ransomware attack and
defense to inform predictions about the prevalence and
severity of this crime in coming years. Drawing
methodological trends from the literature allows me to infer
the trajectories of both cybercriminals and security
researchers. I review scholarly sources, predominantly peer
reviewed research articles, but also industry publications,
news articles, and topical podcasts to establish the methods
by which ransomware attacks are carried out, as well as
cybersecurity experts' approaches to ransomware defense.
By comparing the progress in these two fields I’ll argue that
ransomware is a serious threat, but a threat that
cybersecurity experts can mitigate and significantly
diminish in the future.

Index Terms — Countermeasures, cyberattack,
internet security, ransomware
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ransomware extortion is an emerging type of crime in
which victims must pay to regain access to their computer
or files. You may have heard of ransomware in the news
before. Just last year it was responsible for a shutting-down
hundreds of hospitals in one of the largest medical
cyberattacks the United States has ever seen [1]. A 2014
ransomware attack has cost Home Depot more than US$200
million in total [2]. Maersk, world leader in container
shipping, had to replace 50,000 computers in an attack that
has cost the company roughly US$300 million [3].
Cumulatively, ransomware is estimated to cost the globe
US$20 billion by 2021 [4]. Undeniably, ransomware has
established itself in the few years it’s existed, but what does
the future hold for ransomware?
For the last fifteen years cybersecurity experts have
been fighting an ongoing battle to protect the world from
ransomware. Cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts are
constantly racing to outpace each other’s progress. As
ransomware techniques evolve, new security tools evolve to
thwart cybercriminals. In response, new ransomware
techniques emerge to evade security measures. Eventually
one side has to win out; either ransomware will become too

II.

BACKGROUND

Ransomware is a subset of malicious software designed
to take a victim’s computer or data hostage and demand a
ransom payment to regain access. The term comes from the
combination of the “ransom” the victim is asked to pay and
the “software” that takes hold of the computer system.
These ransoms tend to be paid in cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin, however, paying the ransom doesn’t guarantee the
valuables will be released. When dealing with criminals
there is always the possibility they won’t hold up their end
of the deal. Unfortunately, due to ransomware’s newness
and online anonymity, these criminals often fall through the
cracks of international jurisdiction and go unpunished.
Therefore ransomware has become an attractive low-risk
criminal venture. Being victimized by one of these attacks is
undeniably frightening and challenges users’ sense of online
security.
Ransomware attacks usually follow a predictable
pattern. Below are the basic steps of a standard ransomware
attack; delivery, execution, payment, decryption, and
liquidation [5].
A. Delivery
The ransomware must be delivered to the victim’s
system for the attack to begin. ‘Delivery’ doesn’t
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necessarily capture the harm occurring here though, and
since ransomware is considered a disease this process is also
colloquially referred to as ‘infection’. The actual payload
delivered is called a binary and it’s composed of code that
determines the actions of the ransomware. Infection
methods vary greatly and I will address them in-depth in my
“Infection method” section later.

decryption binary so they can do it manually [6]. Don’t
forget we’re dealing with criminals though, and payment
does not guarantee decryption. At this point the victim has
already made their payment, so there’s little incentive for
the attacker to follow through on decryption.

B. Execution

Finally, time for the ransomware attacker to reap their
rewards! The attacker cashes out their bitcoin in exchange
for a national currency. This is the riskiest stage for the
criminals because it links the proceeds of their crime to their
identity. To mitigate this risk attackers will sometimes
attempt to hide their tracks by shuffling ransom payments
from different victims [5]. Once the ransom has been
liquidated the attack is complete.

The ransomware binary activates and begins following
the instructions that the attack developer set out. As you
would expect in a black market execution instructions vary
widely, making the creation of an accurate ransomware
execution model particularly challenging. Still, ransomware
execution can be divided into three generic stages; stealth
operations, suspicious activities, and obvious actions [6].
1) Stealth Operations: The ransomware must familiarize
itself with the victim’s system before initiating the
attack. Cybercriminals want their ransomware to
remain undetected during this initial step to prevent the
attack from being interrupted prematurely [7].
2) Suspicious Activities: The ransomware initiates the
damaging part of the attack without announcing itself,
potentially remaining undetected. For locker
ransomware this stage would include restricting the
user interface, for crypto ransomware it would include
encryption [6].
3) Obvious Actions: The ransomware announces its attack
to the victim and makes its demands known by way of
ransom note. At this point the damage has been done to
the victim’s system so the ransomware is ready to
reveal itself [6].
C. Payment
Now that the ransomware has been executed it is time
for the victim to decide if they’ll pay the ransom. If they
choose to, payments are usually made in bitcoin rather than
a national currency. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, a digital
currency created to circumvent any central authority.
Whereas national currencies are minted and legally enforced
by a government, bitcoins are entirely decentralized [8].
This makes it attractive to criminals because it’s unregulated
and users remain practically anonymous, providing
cybercriminals a method of receiving ransom payments safe
from prying eyes [5]. Additionally, transactions are
irreversible and bitcoins are universally available for victims
to purchase [9]. Oftentimes ransom notes contain
instructions for the victim to buy bitcoin from online
exchanges then send them to the attacker’s wallet address.
D. Decryption
In the most likely case of a crypto-ransomware attack,
after the payment has been received the ransomware may
decrypt the files automatically or provide the victim with a

E. Liquidation

Ransomware has but one goal by definition, to exploit
the victim. Cybercriminals employ a wide variety of
methods to achieve this goal, but not all methods are created
equal, and as such some gain popularity while others fall out
of favor. An excellent example of this constant evolution is
the transition from locker ransomware to cryptographic
ransomware as the dominant attack method. Locker and
crypto are the two main ransomware types [7], however,
cybercriminals are creative and there are no rules to the
game they play. These two types do not encompass the
entirety of ransomware variety, others exist, but for the
purposes of this example they are appropriate.
From approximately 2011 to 2012 locker ransomware
was the dominant cyber extortion threat, only a few years
after its emergence in 2008 [7]. Locker ransomware is based
on the idea of locking the victim out of their computer. That
is achieved by taking over the user interface, usually
restricting user capabilities so that the computer can only be
used to pay the ransom. Generally, locker ransomware only
affects the user interface, leaving the users’ files unharmed.
That allows tech-savvy victims to often fully recover from
these attacks by restoring system settings or using security
tools [7]. Additionally, if the victim is able to transfer the
computer’s hard drive to an uninfected computer then no
data is lost [10]. Therefore, locker ransomware isn’t the
most effective ransomware variant. To make up for its
weaknesses
many
locker
ransomwares
employ
social-engineering techniques meant to prey on the victims’
fears and emotions to manipulate them into paying the
ransom. For example, it’s common for locker ransomware to
impersonate law enforcement, claiming to have caught the
user engaging in illegal activity online, then asking the
victim to pay a fine for their indiscretion. While it has the
potential to be very effective against simple computers with
limited user interface functionality, locker ransomware has
its weaknesses against complex computers [7]. For these
reasons cybercriminals began transitioning to cryptographic
ransomware en masse in 2013 and haven’t looked back.
In 2013 crypto ransomware rose to become the
dominant cyber extortion threat and continued to explode in
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popularity among cybercriminals [7]. By 2016 more than
95% of new ransomware was of the crypto variety [6].
Cryptographic ransomware is based on the idea of locking
the victim out of their files, rather than just their computer,
and the only person that can unlock that data is the attacker.
A cryptograph is a coded message, so this variant of
ransomware achieves its goals through encryption,
translating valuable files into unreadable gibberish that only
the attacker can decrypt. Encryption requires a key -- a
string of letters and numbers, like a password -- so when an
attacker locks your file with their key that file can only be
unlocked with their key. In this way the attacker denies the
victim access to their personal files while often leaving
computer functionality otherwise untouched. Once struck by
a crypto attack a victims only method of recovery is
decryption of the affected files, whether that be via ransom
or a decryption tool. The penetrating nature of cryptographic
ransomware paired with the strength of mathematical
encryption makes crypto-ransomware very effective [7].
Due to the ubiquitous nature of crypto ransomware in recent
years any future references to ransomware will refer to
crypto ransomware unless otherwise specified.
III. BRIEF RANSOMWARE HISTORY
Ransomware is one of the biggest focuses for
cybersecurity experts right now [9]. Studying the events that
have made ransomware what it is today is helpful in
understanding the future of ransomware.
A. 1989
First recorded ransomware, the AIDS Trojan, is
deployed at the World Health Organization’s International
Aids conference via 5¼ inch floppy disks mailed to the
conference intentionally mislabeled “AIDS Information –
Introductory Diskettes''. The first of its kind, the AIDS
Trojan didn’t actually pose a threat because it used such
simple, symmetric cryptography. The ransom was set at
$189 USD to be sent to a PO box in Panama. Unlike most
ransomware we know who the author was, Joseph L Popp, a
biologist now considered the ‘father of ransomware’ [11].
Clearly ransomware was not a threat at this point, rather, in
this era malware was used in pranks and vandalism to gain
notoriety [7].
B. 1996
Adam Young and Moti Yung, cryptographers, describe
the concept of cryptographic ransomware and name it
cryptovirology. They published a groundbreaking paper
proposing that cryptography -- traditionally used
defensively for privacy, authentication, and security -- could
be used offensively for extortion-based attacks. They
emphasize that asymmetric encryption is essential to these
attacks, and warn that access to cryptographic tools should

be well controlled [12]. Unfortunately, that warning fell on
deaf ears, setting the stage for ransomware to come.
C. 2005
Young and Yung implement the concept they had
described years earlier and once again warn against the
threat of ransomware. However, this time they also include
some user countermeasures: backup your data, have a strong
defense (firewall and antivirus), and only download from
trusted sources [13]. This represents the first known
crypto-ransomware implementation and established the
expectation that cybersecurity experts publish ransomware
countermeasures.
D. 2006
The first criminal ransomware to make use of
asymmetric encryption emerges, only one year after Yung
and Young’s proof-of-concept. As they had warned, this
represents a massive leap forward in the destructive
potential of ransomware and the emergence of effective
criminal cryptoransomware. There’s some debate over
which ransomware virus did it first, but it was either
Archiveus Trojan or GPcode. GPcode disguised itself in a
malicious job application email attachment and targeted
Russian internet users [11]. The author of GPcode continued
to improve their ransomware by enhancing the encryption
strength, releasing three versions in the span of five days;
the third version used encryption that would have taken 30
years for a contemporary computer to crack [14]. Archiveus
Trojan required victims to purchase items from an online
pharmacy to receive the 30-digit decryption key [11].
E. 2007
Lou & Liao, security researchers, published a paper
claiming that users’ misuse of computer systems had
resulted in privacy violations skyrocketing. In response they
began promoting awareness and education of ransomware as
a means of ransomware prevention [15]. Importantly, this
was the first time researchers in information systems
security addressed ransomware.
F. 2008
Gazet, a computer virologist, analyzed three early
families of ransomware based on their quality of code,
ransomware functionality, and cryptographic strength. He
concluded that researchers should continue to monitor
ransomware, but at the time it was not mature and complex
enough to warrant the attention it was receiving in the
media, going as far as to say that it was doomed to failure as
a mass extortion scheme [16]. At this point the research
community had identified ransomware as a problem, but
dismissed its severity without even offering potential
solutions.
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G. 2009
Bitcoin enters the scene and revolutionizes
ransomware, transforming it into an established black
market. Up until now, ransoms had to be paid in roundabout
ways because untraceable online payment was not an
option. For example, victims have paid by mailing prepaid
cash-equivalent cards, calling a premium rate phone
number, or ordering goods from the attacker’s online store
[10]. Ransomware attackers were eager to transition to
Bitcoin because existing methods were inherently traceable
[5].
H. 2013
CryptoLocker is unleashed upon the world and spreads
like wildfire. As the name suggests CryptoLocker is a
crypto-ransomware; its infection methods include malicious
email attachments sent to business professionals and
misleading downloads on compromised websites [11].
CryptoLocker went on to infect roughly 500,000 machines
and experts estimate CryptoLocker’s revenue at US$3
million conservatively and US$27 million on the high end
[17]. Once the ransom note had been presented victims were
only given three days to pay, after which the decryption key
would be deleted or the price would jump dramatically,
depending on the version. CryptoLocker demonstrated to
cybercriminals and researchers that cryptoransomware was
a mature business model characterized by reliable and
untraceable payment. Within three months other
cybercriminals adopted CryptoLocker’s business model and
multiple copycat ransomwares began circulating [18]. The
impact CryptoLocker had on the ransomware industry is
best illustrated by looking at the number of attacks in 2013;
100,000 in January and 600,000 in December [7]. Attacking
at such scale put a target on CryptoLocker’s back, and
within one year security firms had infiltrated the
cybercriminal network and set up an online decryption
portal which helped keep the percentage of victims that paid
the ransom low at 1.3% [17].
I. 2015
A cybersecurity research group publishes a
groundbreaking study in the same research area as Gazet.
Similar to the previous study but larger, this study reviewed
1,359 ransomware samples from 2006-2014 and found that
although a few ransomware samples were sophisticated and
threatening, most used superficial techniques [19]. Once
again the research community argued that stopping
advanced ransomware attacks was simpler than the media
was reporting. However, this paper took it one step further.
In the process of studying so many ransomware extortion
methods they determined that ransomware could
theoretically be detected and distinguished from harmless
applications by measuring system behavior. This discovery

is massively important because it enables researchers to
begin detecting ransomware attacks for the first time.
Whereas previous research dismissed ransomware as a
legitimate threat and stopped there, Kharraz et al. develops a
foundational model of ransomware behavior and uses it to
advance state-of-the-art defense.
J. 2016
The next year a follow up study was published that
implemented the method described in the 2015 paper. By
monitoring file accesses and system behavior the research
team was able to detect ransomware with a 96.3% accuracy
[20]. This is the birth of detection-based defense, an
important approach to ransomware defense. Much of the
ransomware defense research that has since been published
builds upon this study’s techniques, or in some way has
these authors to thank.
K. 2017
Ransomware has its most notorious year to date with
the widespread attack of WannaCry. WannaCry leveraged an
exploit created by the National Security Agency (NSA) that
had been stolen and leaked by a group known as the Shadow
Brokers. The initial infection likely occurred over an
unprotected public internet connection, essentially coffee
shop Wi-Fi. What made WannaCry especially devastating
was its ability to self propagate like a true virus, meaning
damage is not only limited to the machine infected but any
other machine on that network [21]. In a matter of hours
WannaCry infected hundreds of thousands of machines in
more than 150 countries, targeting individual users, business
organizations, and public agencies. Although not very
profitable, WannaCry infamously targeted the United
Kingdom’s National Health Service which catapulted
ransomware into public consciousness [11].
L. 2019
Early in the year a group of cybersecurity researchers
published a study of contemporary ransomware and
concluded it was rapidly diversifying. The recommendation
to counter this diversification was to develop better models
of ransomware behavior so defenders can more effectively
detect and respond to attacks [6]. At this point the research
community had fully embraced the idea that they could offer
solutions to combat ransomware. Late in the same year
MITRE ATT&CK, a cybersecurity expert curated
ransomware model, was published online. ATT&CK stands
for Adversarial Techniques, Tactics, & Common
Knowledge. As the acronym suggests, the model catalogs
ransomware methods and was freely available to any person
or organization for the purpose of creating a safer world
[22].
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As you can gather from this brief timeline, in the last
fifteen years defending against ransomware has become a
serious challenge that we must not underestimate. Early on
ransomware development moved slowly and was often
pioneered by security research. Security experts were ahead
of the curve until cryptocurrencies gave cybercriminals the
tools they needed to criminally abuse academic research
anonymously. Ransomware defense has been playing
catch-up ever since, but even with ransomware attack on the
forefront, development isn’t linear. Oftentimes one criminal
or group innovates and makes a sporadic leap in
ransomware progress that others copy, then that technique
becomes widespread and eventually standard practice.
Also, ransomware developers have an inherent head
start on large-scale defense efforts for two main reasons.
First, even when security measures have been suggested by
professionals and the dangers warned against, little
preventative action has been taken. Only in recent years
have we seen ransomware warnings finally taken seriously
by governments and industries, but it's taken financial
incentives to make that change. It would appear that only
after being burnt are organizations willing to invest the
resources necessary to heed the warnings that the stove is
hot. Second, as new ransomware attack variants emerge,
ransomware defenders need time to develop a suitable
defense. Consider the criminal black market that
ransomware innovation operates within today. Very little
information is available to defense researchers for them to
base their techniques upon, besides those observations they
make themselves. Similar to a fighter facing a new
opponent, defense researchers need to learn the strengths
and weaknesses of their foe before making an educated
decision on how to fight. Thankfully, in the last few years
the fight is swinging in favor of defenders as they
collectively share their cumulative knowledge and enjoy
greater access to essential resources.
IV. RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION
Ransomware is a growing threat to which we are all
vulnerable. Despite this fact, the general population isn’t
adequately knowledgeable about ransomware or how to
defend themselves against it, particularly college students
[6]. A 2017 study found that despite being a likely target for
ransomware attacks, more than half of college students were
not familiar with the term ‘ransomware’ [6]. Cybersecurity
experts refer to the three pillars of user-based cybersecurity:
awareness, behavior, and culture [23]. In keeping with
Portland State University’s motto “Let Knowledge Serve
The City”, I wanted to take the opportunity to spread
awareness about this danger to students and faculty and
potentially have a positive impact on the cybersecurity of
PSU. To this end I have included a list of seven best
practices that Internet users can follow to protect themselves
from becoming a ransomware victim in the Prevention
section.
V. A TTACK OVERVIEW

Ransomware authors have to make many choices when
they write their malware. Like most criminals, their primary
incentive is to maximize their financial gain. Don’t forget,
no matter how sophisticated the attack, money doesn’t come
from the computer, it must come from the victim. The best
way to maximize profits is by making the right decisions
about what user market to target, what computer system to
attack, and how to infect that computer. Like many
industries cybercriminals are in competition with one
another, and as such they observe each other succeeding or
failing they learn from one another and an ecosystem forms
that practices Darwinian evolution. Over time this has led to
impressive technological innovation by cyber criminals. In
this section I’ll investigate the decisions ransomware
attackers must make, and identify overarching trends in the
attacker ecosystem.
A. Users Targeted
Ransomware authors must decide what type of users to
attack, essentially who they’d like to extort. As mentioned
before, ransomware attacks are fundamentally financially
motivated, so choosing which users to target is at its core an
economic decision. Originally, attackers did not write their
ransomware with a particular type of user in mind, choosing
instead to cast a wide net with their attacks [7]. This
approach works because of the sheer quantity of Internet
users; attackers are collecting relatively small ransoms from
many victims. A single ransomware virus could be
distributed to millions of users worldwide and only a small
fraction of users would need to pay the ransom to make the
whole scheme profitable. More recently however,
ransomware attackers’ preferences seem to have shifted to
favor collecting relatively large ransoms from fewer victims.
Rather than targeting individuals ransomware authors are
now focused more on targeting organizations [9, 18].
For the majority of ransomware’s history home users
have been victimized by attacks more than organizations.
According to Symantec’s 2015 whitepaper, ransomware is
particularly effective against home users for three key
reasons. First, because they’re an individual rather than an
organization they have the least amount of access to
technical assistance. Second, they are the least likely to be
fluent with their technology. And third, they are the least
likely to be familiar with ransomware. Considering those
three key reasons, it’s easy to imagine how home user
victims can feel helpless, scared, and overwhelmed when
they discover they’ve been attacked. Ransomware attackers
know that those emotions improve their odds of collecting a
ransom, and as such, manipulate those emotions in a
practice known as social engineering [7]. Home users have
sentimental attachment to the data being held for ransom
because personally important files, information, and
documents are at stake. A low ransom may be a small price
to pay to regain access to wedding photos, a video game
save file, a nearly completed thesis paper, or your medical
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records. Stop and think, is there anything on your home
system that you couldn’t live without?
Nowadays, ransomware attackers mostly target
organizations, defined as private businesses and public
agencies such as educational institutes, medical institutes,
law enforcement entities, etc.. Unlike an individual home
user, organizations have access to far greater resources.
Those resources enable organizations to hire cyber security
professionals that can help implement effective defenses
against ransomware attacks and respond to an ongoing
attack. Organizations can also purchase ransomware
insurance to mitigate the financial risk of a ransomware
attack. In fact, 84% of organizations surveyed in a 2020
study had cybersecurity insurance, and 80% of those
policies cover ransomware [24]. However, data can still be
stolen from the company records and extorted by
threatening to release it to the public, which insurance
doesn’t help with. It may seem like organizations are safe
from attacks because of the resources at their disposal,
however many businesses rely on their digital systems to
perform their service, so a ransomware attack that interrupts
their services can put them out of business [7, 25]. In this
way a ransomware attack can be fatal for a company in a
way it isn’t for an individual.
Since roughly 2015 there has been an apparent shift in
ransomware attacker’s approach. Rather than targeting
home users, ransomware authors have transitioned away
from residential attacks and are focusing on business and
agency attacks [18]. Interestingly, despite what news
headlines would lead us to believe, the private sector is
attacked more frequently than the public sector; generally,
private organizations have no obligation to publicly report
attacks and are actually incentivized not to report them. In
2019 alone 45% of public sector organizations reported
being attacked by ransomware, less than the global average
for any organization type at 51%, and less than the most
frequently attacked industry (entertainment) at 60% [24].
Cybersecurity experts believe this trend exists because
ransomware attacks are able to extort higher ransoms from a
business than they could an individual [9]. According to a
2020 study analyzing business insurance claims, the cost of
business interruptions in the form of lost revenue and repair
costs often outweigh the ransom being demanded [25]. In
our increasingly digitized economy a successful cyber attack
can slow or halt all business operations, increasing the
pressure felt by a ransomware victim to pay up.
This shift is good news for the average home Internet
user but bad news for businesses and agencies. Continuing
in this trajectory, in the future you’ll be less likely to have
your wedding photos ransomed on your home computer, but
more likely to have your workplace compromised. This
trend emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity training in
the workplace, now and in the future, since that’s where we
see a disproportionately high amount of attacks.
B. Systems Targeted

Ransomware authors must decide what type of
computer to infect. Infection is their means of seizing
something valuable from the victim, so they want to choose
their target strategically. In general, cybercriminals are faced
with four main systems: personal computers, mobile
devices, servers, and Internet of Things devices [7]. The
nature of most ransomware attacks requires that they can
access cryptography tools already in the computer’s
operating system (OS), so they need to be OS specific.
Originally, ransomware was only designed to target personal
computers, particularly Windows machines. But once
mobile devices had been widely adopted by the public that
opened the door for ransomware authors to expand their list
of targeted systems. In recent years there’s been a dramatic
shift towards mobile devices like cell phones and tablets,
and Internet of Things devices such as security cameras and
smart thermostats. Lastly, cloud computing has been
consistently replacing on-premise servers and server attacks
have followed suit, now targeting public cloud computing
services.
Personal computers, particularly those running a
Windows OS, have historically been the most heavily
targeted system. The reason Windows was so heavily
targeted is because Windows computers represent the vast
majority of computers in use globally [7]. It made sense for
criminals to target Windows at that time because most
victims were accessible via Windows, and this was in a time
when home users were still being targeted most heavily.
When going after an organization attackers also tend to
target servers, which often contain valuable data or host
important web services. Attackers target servers because
they’re usually business critical, and organizations risk
serious losses if they can’t use their servers as detailed in the
Users Targeted section. Ransomware attackers were
targeting all technologies that were viable to attack in the
early days of digitalization, victimizing people and
organizations from all angles.
With the invention of smartphones came a new avenue
of revenue for ransomware attackers. As smartphones and
other mobile devices were widely adopted an increasing
percentage of people owned personal computers, only these
ones fit in your pocket. Mobile devices from smart watches
to phones to tablets became the second most targeted system
because of their ubiquity [7]. Ransomware authors pivoted
to capitalize on the growing market and unsurprisingly this
became a reliable method of targeting individual users.
Mobile devices tend to come in two OSs, either iOS or
Android [7]. iOS for Apple devices are pretty safe because
Apple has strict rules for app developers and consumers.
Dissimilarly, Android is very open source and customizable,
making them the primary target for mobile attacks. Also,
Android has a larger share of the global market, roughly
three quarters of phones use Android, so it makes sense
from the perspective of attackers to go after the most
victims possible [26]. Evidently, ransomware authors target
their attacks wherever they see numerous ransoms to be
paid, and therefore profit to be made.
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It’s been more than a decade since the initial release of
the smartphone, and in that time other technologies
collectively referred to as Internet of Things (IoT) have
emerged and risen to global popularity. IoT devices are
electronics that use an Internet connection to transfer data
and receive software updates. In 2018 these devices
numbered between 18 billion and 35 billion, a significant
growth from the estimated 2 billion devices in 2010 [27].
While smartphones are technically IoT devices, there’s been
a trend towards expanding beyond mobile devices to other
IoT devices. One particularly startling cyberattack of this
nature, which was carried out by researchers rather than
cybercriminals, targeted a Jeep Grand Cherokee. The
researchers were able to remotely take control of the vehicle
over the Internet, controlling the steering, brakes, radio, air
conditioning, essentially everything, leaving the driver
powerless [28]. If it’s possible for researchers it’s possible
for cybercriminals, and it’s not hard to imagine how a
cybercriminal could extort any ransom they please when
they can steer you into oncoming traffic. A more recent but
equally memorable example, this time perpetrated by
genuine cybercriminals, involved extracting a casino’s
customer database through an unsecured fish tank
thermometer [29]. While no ransom was demanded, this
attack clearly demonstrates cybercriminals’ ability to
innovate and find security weaknesses in new technologies.
The trend of innovative extortion continues to this day,
as evidenced by the growing presence of public cloud
attacks. In the early years of ransomware servers physically
existed at the same location as the organization’s buildings
-- these are known as on-premise servers -- so ransomware
attacks targeted on-premise servers. Now however, many
organizations have pivoted away from on-premise servers
and are opting instead to use a public cloud to store their
data, such as Amazon Web Services or Microsoft Azure.
According to a 2020 survey of 5,000 information
technology (IT) managers across a variety of organizations
59% of cryptoransomware attacks included encrypting data
in the public cloud [24]. If that weren’t enough, cloud
security threats have heightened dramatically with the
coronavirus pandemic pushing so many employees to work
remotely, forcing the suspension of IT security standards at
short notice [25]. A survey conducted after the onset of the
pandemic of 250 Chief Information Security Officers at
large companies listed cloud usage in the top three threats
during the work from home period [25]. Cybercriminals are
undeniably opportunistic, and will exploit changes in
technology and technology usage to their advantage.
Systems targeted by ransomware started simple but
have been expanding to keep up with technological
innovation and user behavior, trending most recently
towards Internet of Things devices and public cloud
services. This demonstrates cybercriminals’ willingness to
branch out and try new targets. As new technologies
continually emerge and are widely adopted, new attack
surfaces repeatedly present themselves and cybercriminals
are always going to pursue those possibilities. It’s up to

ransomware defenders to prevent those possibilities from
coming to fruition and victimizing individuals and
organizations.
C. Infection Method
Once a ransomware author has created their virus it
must be distributed to computer systems to create victims
and generate revenue. Cybercriminals have many choices
when deciding how to infect victims, but traditional choices
have taken advantage of human error, or at least human
interaction. Techniques are constantly evolving though, and
recent developments have circumvented the need for human
error. Ransomware infection vectors are trending towards
more automated and efficient distribution.
Historically, ransomware authors have relied upon their
victims taking action to infect systems. This variety of
infection generally takes the form of a malicious email
attachment, a malicious website that performs an unsolicited
download, or malicious advertisements on an otherwise
trustworthy website. Ransomware authors prefer these
methods because in most cases it’s much easier to trick a
user into downloading a file or visiting a website than it is to
bypass the user and trick the computer.
The most popular infection method over the last fifteen
years has been malicious emails disguised as harmless
emails that aim to deceive the recipient into downloading an
attachment or clicking a link [6]. Oftentimes the attachment
will be the ransomware binary, so once it’s downloaded it
begins executing and encrypting files. In the case of a
malicious link the most likely scenario is that it leads to a
malicious website that performs an unsolicited download
(known as a “drive-by download”). You’ve probably been
warned about these emails before, they’re commonly
referred to as phishing emails. According to a 2020 survey
of 5,000 IT managers across a variety of organizations 45%
of ransomware attacks originated from phishing emails [24].
When cybercriminals send out millions of these emails it’s
referred to as malspam. Malspam is effective because
cybercriminals can get very creative with their emails, using
a variety of psychological tactics to convince the recipient to
click, such as time sensitive offers. Cybercriminals are
targeting the weakest link in security systems -- humans -when they’re engaging in phishing malspam, so the only
effective mitigation is user education.
Besides fooling the user with phishing email,
cybercriminals have used two main methods to download
their binaries onto victims’ systems. First, cybercriminals
create malicious websites for the sole purpose of performing
drive-by downloads. All the user has to do is visit the site
for their device to become infected, so attackers redirect
traffic to their site. Cybercriminals use exploit kits,
ransomware tools packaged together for ease, to redirect
users from a legitimate website to a malicious website [9].
In this scenario a user could click a link from a search
results page or a phishing email and, through no fault of
their own, end up on a malicious website. This technique
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requires human action, but not human error, and as such are
difficult to mitigate with user education alone. Second,
cybercriminals can compromise a trustworthy website by
inserting malicious code into advertisements they take out
[9]. These advertisements may redirect users that click on
the ad to a malicious website, or they may perform a
drive-by download without the need for users to even click
the ad. This technique is especially effective because
cybercriminals can compromise websites with heavy traffic,
such as Spotify or The New York Times [30].
Recently however, ransomware authors have been
coming up with techniques that eliminate the need for
victim action. Older techniques still get plenty of use
because they’re undeniably effective, but ransomware
innovation is headed in the direction of automation. Newer
ransomware samples such as WannaCry can automatically
self-replicate over the internet network by taking advantage
of a Windows OS security flaw, therefore any device
connected to the same internet as the infected device is
immediately at risk. Admittedly, this technique still relies on
user action to initiate, but once that has happened further
propagation is user-free. This represents an all new threat
level because once one device becomes infected then any
data on the network is in peril, gone are the days of one
action leading to one infection.
Another growing trend in the ransomware distribution
space is the adoption of the Ransomware as a Service
(RaaS) affiliate profit sharing scheme. RaaS is a criminal
business model where one party creates the ransomware and
hires other parties to distribute the ransomware [9]. This
model has two main benefits. First, the risk of being caught
is shared between the two parties [7]. Ransomware authors
insulate themselves from the risks of distribution by
interfacing with victims through their affiliates [31].
Affiliates are presumably willing to assume this risk because
they get a share of the ransom without writing any
ransomware. Second, division of labor allows
cybercriminals to specialize and focus on what they do best,
whether that be programming or distribution [7]. Many
ametuer cybercriminals lack the skills and resources
necessary to write code that can outsmart modern
cybersecurity defenses, but they are capable of malspam and
drive-by downloads [7]. Exploit kits can be purchased for a
nominal fee, or even found for free, on the Dark Web and
that’s all someone needs to begin participating in the
cybercriminal ecosystem [9]. RaaS lowers the barrier of
entry for cybercriminals, expanding the reach that authors
can have [7]. Ransomware is trending towards organized
crime, ransomware defenders and law enforcement must
incorporate this knowledge into their respective approaches.
D. Attack Conclusion
Ransomware attacks are a growing threat, there's no
denying that attackers are continuing to innovate. Attackers
have set their sights on organizational cash cows while at
the same time finding new ways to victimize individuals.

Tried and true methods of infection such as phishing
malspam and website redirects are being made easier by the
availability of exploit kits and RaaS partnerships. Alongside
those methods, newer more efficient ransomware variants
that spread like a virus without user interaction are being
added to attackers’ arsenal. As it stands now, there’s a
strong financial incentive for attackers to develop new
techniques to maximize their revenue from exploiting users,
and that’s led to serious innovation.
Modern ransomware has been in its heyday since its
birth in 2006. It came into a world that was totally
unprepared to defend against it and in many ways it still
enjoys the element of surprise. Cybercriminals inherently
have a head start because when they develop new and
creative attack methods it takes time for cybersecurity
defenders to engineer and implement defenses. To make
matters worse, the attack surface for ransomware authors is
rapidly expanding as the world becomes more digitized and
interconnected, particularly threatening IoT devices.
Meanwhile, cybercriminals are utilizing business models to
specialize their labor, allowing for faster development by
increasingly powerful authors, and more menacing
distribution from a wave of ametuer cybercriminals. For
these reasons ransomware isn’t going away immediately.
VI. DEFENSE OVERVIEW
After reading all about the innovations of attack,
ransomware defense is understandably not an easy task, but
significant money and energy is being invested in putting an
end to ransomware. Academic researchers, government
agencies, and private cybersecurity firms all want to help.
Even though ransomware attacks are criminal, law
enforcement agencies have not historically been equipped to
deal with this new kind of crime, in fact they get ransomed
too. International attacks don’t really fall under any
country’s legal jurisdiction, so a lot of the responsibility has
fallen to researchers trying to keep up with cybercriminals
in real time. Ultimately, up to now the burden of stemming
the flow of ransomware attacks has fallen to cybersecurity
experts.
So how do researchers go about such a monolithic task?
Researchers study how ransomware operates then create
models from which they devise countermeasures.
Ransomware is an underground black market, therefore
reputable information is hard to come by. Defending against
an unknown threat is near impossible because defenders are
working from incomplete information. The more complete
cyber security experts’ understanding of ransomware
attacks, the better equipped they are to thwart those attacks
[6]. Once models are created to describe how ransomware
attacks work, then researchers can begin to counter those
attacks. Without the models they wouldn’t know where to
start. Essentially, researchers have to witness ransomware
attacks to learn how to react to them.
Thankfully, academic researchers and professional
experts have been working together to construct generic
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models of ransomware attack methods. One such model,
created by American not-for-profit, government funded
cybersecurity research corporation MITRE, exists to
"create a comprehensive list of known adversary
tactics and techniques used during a cyberattack.
Open to government, education, and commercial
organizations, it should be able to collect a wide,
and hopefully exhaustive, range of attack stages
and sequences. MITRE ATT&CK is intended to
create
a
standard
taxonomy to make
communications between organizations more
specific."
Breakthroughs in defenders’ understanding of attack
techniques have made leaps and bounds in recent years,
proving the hypothesis that progress can be made when
adequate resources are allocated. For example, in 2019
David Lu, a security researcher and PSU professor, authored
a corporate blog post arguing that MITRE ATT&CK is
“tremendously valuable [...] to better communicate,
collaborate, account for, and reason about the domain in a
scientific manner”, but at the time the model is inadequately
organized and in need of structural improvements [32]. In
2020 MITRE ATT&CK introduced sub-categories to
resolve the issues present in the previous iteration of the
model. Just one year after Lu’s call to action he posted
another article praising MITRE for their improvements,
stating that the newer model is more usable and provides
finer detail [33]. This is a clear example of the collaborative
ransomware defense ecosystem rising to the challenge of
working to enable iterative improvements quickly. As attack
models are fine tuned and updated, ransomware defense
trends towards increased security.
Thankfully MITRE is just one of many groups pushing
for accurate ransomware models. Efforts from academic
researchers have resulted in the creation of Randep, a model
of the Windows API functions called by ransomware
samples, useful for classifying and predicting ransomware
behavior [6]. Private entities have also found success when
partnering with academic researchers. A 2018 paper by
Google and Chainalysis partnered with University of
California San Diego, New York University, and Princeton
University, performed the difficult work of tracking ransom
payments through the once-anonymous Bitcoin blockchain
to construct a model of the ransomware attacker ecosystem
[5]. These groups of talented, driven, and bright individuals
along with many other groups like them, are working to
establish consistent methodologies so our understanding of
ransomware attack, and therefore capability to implement
ransomware defense, is trending upwards.
Once an understanding of ransomware attacks is
established then security experts can begin implementing
defenses. Most often this comes in the form of a
downloadable tool for your computer, but also includes user
education, online resources for victims, and law
enforcement response. There are three general approaches to

ransomware defense taken by cybersecurity experts.
Recovery, meaning the victim is able to fully recover from
an attack without paying the ransom. Detection, meaning
the attack is detected as it’s happening and defended against.
Lastly prevention, meaning the attack is proactively
mitigated before any damage can be done to the victim’s
system. In this section I will investigate how ransomware
defense has changed over time to inform predictions about
ransomware defense in the future.
A. Recovery
Recovery is the most passive defense approach to
ransomware defense, based on the idea that the victim is
able to regain access to their stolen valuables without paying
the ransom. Historically, the cybersecurity community has
been willing to invest ample time and energy into
ransomware detection and prevention, but less attention is
given to methods to recover the stolen files after infection
[34]. A variety of techniques exist to help victims recover
from successful attacks, ranging from decryption to key
escrow systems to simple backups.
Backups offer a straightforward and effective solution
to the ransomware threat by providing a recovery point for a
victim’s system, therefore files can be retrieved without
paying a ransom. Although no silver bullet exists that can
defeat all forms of ransomware, backups are the closest
thing users can get. Keeping a separate copy of the data
being ransomed effectively removes all bargaining power
from the attacker. Additionally, users that regularly backup
their data enjoy peace of mind because they have little
reason to fear an attack. Unfortunately, despite the
widespread availability of backup technology, many home
users haven’t implemented an effective backup strategy to
successfully recover from a ransomware attack. According
to a 2015 survey 25% of home users had never backed up
files at home, while 55% backed up some but not all of their
files at home. This unsettling statistic indicates that the
majority of home users are exposed, to some degree, to
ransomware attacks. Additionally, only 25% of home users
backed up files at least once a week, meaning that 75% of
home users would lose more than a week’s worth of files in
the event of a ransomware attack [7]. The lack of backups
can likely be attributed to a lack of user awareness and
education. Therefore, increasing users’ understanding of the
importance of backups, which ultimately leads to a change
in user behavior, represents a trend towards greater recovery
rates. Alternatively, decreasing the knowledge or effort
required of users to create reliable backups has the same
desirable result.
In the early days of ransomware attackers used
symmetric encryption, the more basic type of encryption
that requires the same key to encrypt and decrypt data [35].
Symmetric encryption is quick to implement but is
inherently simple to reverse, so it didn’t take long for
cybersecurity experts to reverse engineer the malware and
provide decryption tools [7]. The first generation of crypto
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ransomwares were easily thwarted because cybercriminals’
techniques were outmatched by those of cybersecurity
experts. However, as Yung and Young had predicted,
ransomware techniques improved to leverage asymmetric
encryption, the more complex type of encryption that uses
two different keys to encrypt and decrypt data. This
development hampered researchers’ decryption efforts
dramatically, but decryption tools were still being published.
Oftentimes, once a cybersecurity expert discovers a method
of decrypting files damaged by a particular sample of
ransomware they’ll publish the method online for victims to
use.
Utilizing asymmetric encryption made file recovery
much more difficult, but researchers have identified a
method for recovery from ransomware infections on
Windows systems. This method relies on a common
weakness in ransomware implementation and the capability
of Windows to create shadow copies. Shadow copies are
backup copies of the user’s system that are saved at regular
intervals so in the event of a system failure you can restore
the system to a recovery checkpoint [7]. Unfortunately for
victims, later generation ransomware samples are advanced
enough to delete shadow copies during their attacks, leaving
no restoration points with which to recover. Fortunately for
victims, according to a 2016 study users can prevent the
four most common crypto-ransomwares from deleting their
shadow copies by renaming the system tool that handles
shadow copies [34]. The researchers used this finding to
produce a script that automatically renames the appropriate
tool. Once a user has run the script their computer is
effectively capable of recovering from a ransomware attack
via restoration to a state prior to encryption [34]. A
technique that was once a cybercriminal innovation has
since been entirely mitigated by researchers in a way that
reduces the knowledge demanded of users, further evidence
of a trend towards more ransomware recoveries.
Another recovery method is a key escrow system that
involves storing recent encryption keys in a secure vault to
be used for decryption. In the event of a successful
ransomware attack the user’s key vault captures the
encryption key, making file recovery via decryption a trivial
task. One such tool called PayBreak was published in 2017
by a team of researchers in collaboration with MITRE.
PayBreak continually monitors the integrity of files on the
user’s computer, keeping an eye out for telltale ransomware
behavior. Since most ransomware attacks rely on
cryptography tools in the computer’s operating system,
PayBreak can reference attack models to know which
function calls are suspicious, then store encryption keys as
encryption occurs [35]. PayBreak was tested with 107
ransomware samples spanning twelve ransomware families,
including two of the most financially devastating families of
2016, and demonstrated 100% file recovery for each attack,
effectively defeating the threat of cryptographic ransomware
[35]. Although ransomware attackers could change their
techniques to evade PayBreak, for example writing their
own cryptographic functions rather than using what’s

available, this tool significantly increases the effort required
to pull off an unrecoverable attack. PayBreak eliminates the
threat from a huge group of ransomware samples and in
doing so forces attackers to employ new and challenging
techniques that most have avoided. Best of all, PayBreak’s
source code was published in 2017 and the tool is freely
available to the public [35].
Ransomware recovery methods are steadily improving
as defenders develop a stronger understanding of their
adversary. System and file backups offer the simplest
solution, but a disappointing proportion of Internet users
neglect to take this step. In response security experts raise
awareness of their importance and computer manufacturers
implement automatic backups. When ransomware attackers
began targeting the shadow copies researchers found a way
to counteract that, simplified the setup, and released it to the
public. Alongside that specific remedy, defenders created a
more robust defense that covers a wide variety of
ransomware variants and isn't easily overcome. This tool,
PayBreak, was released to the public free of charge too.
Recovery may be a last resort in the domain of ransomware
defense, but its ability to help victimized users and keep
money out of cybercriminals’ pockets is profound. As the
proportion of infections that result in recovery rather than
ransom increases, the battle against ransomware swings in
the direction of defense.
B. Detection
Detection is the oldest approach to ransomware
defense, founded on the idea of observing and halting an
attack as it happens, greatly reducing the need for recovery
efforts. Researchers have established two main methods of
attack detection; analyzing the behavior of the computer
system to identify anomalies, and luring the ransomware
into attacking a decoy file. Both techniques require an
accurate and detailed model of ransomware attack
techniques to work properly. Behavioral analysis requires an
understanding of ransomware encryption patterns to
recognize the attack quickly, and decoy files work best with
an understanding of how ransomware prioritizes which files
it targets. With improvements in attack modeling come
improvements in detection techniques as defenders have
more information at their disposal. This causal relationship
is best illustrated by the newfound capability of detection
tools to identify unfamiliar ransomware samples [36].
Additionally, detection’s upward trend is evidenced by the
decreasing time between infection and detection, and the
existence of mitigation strategies for ransomware that’s yet
to exist [18, 37].
Decoy files are one of the simplest techniques for
detecting ransomware attacks. They operate by lying in wait
alongside the user’s other files and raising a red alarm when
they’re disturbed, similar to a landmine [18]. Because these
files are not intended to be accessed by the user any file
activity is assumed to be a ransomware attack. The
effectiveness of decoy files as a deception-based detection
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technique is reliant on the ransomware’s willingness to
encrypt a decoy file. As such, researchers study methods to
minimize the damage an attack renders to a system before
being halted.
In 2017 a team of researchers reverse engineered eleven
distinct ransomware samples to understand how they
traverse a victim’s file system and found that every sample
sorted files alphabetically [37]. Based on their research of
existing ransomware they developed a defense technique,
and even went one step further by developing defense
techniques based on their predictions of alternative ordering
methods future ransomware authors may use to evade
deception-based defenses. To defeat current, decoy-blind
ransomware they propose naming decoy files such that they
are encrypted first when sorting alphabetically. To defeat
future ransomware, which may order files by file size or
access time, they propose methods of prioritizing decoy files
based on file size and access time. To defeat future
ransomware that orders files randomly they propose
utilizing a greater quantity of decoy files which statistically
results in faster attack detection. Not only did this research
team identify methods to mitigate known threats, they also
thought several steps ahead in the battle against ransomware
authors.
In a 2020 PhD dissertation author Genc takes a hard
look at existing deception-based anti-ransomware systems
and identifies multiple weaknesses that could be exploited
by current decoy-blind and future decoy-aware ransomware.
Interestingly, the existence of such decoy-aware
ransomware is purely speculative, therefore Genc is
identifying a weakness in current defenses and predicting
how attackers may take advantage of that. Based on an
in-depth literature review of deception-based defense tools,
Genc provides advice on which decoy techniques to
abandon because they’re too easily evaded, and best
practices on how to improve current techniques for greater
effectiveness against decoy-aware ransomware.
Consider that deception-based detection techniques
were first published in 2016, and by 2017 researchers were
optimizing their techniques for decoy-blind ransomware,
then by 2020 there were strategies that would mitigate
attacks from decoy-aware ransomware. Every step of the
way, defenders are staying a few steps ahead, working from
an understanding of how future ransomware samples will
likely operate to mitigate ransomware authors’ inherent
head start.
Behavioral analysis is another technique for detecting
ransomware attacks, this one based on continuously
observing system behavior and watching for telltale signs of
ransomware. Because ransomware usually tries to encrypt
many files quickly, detection tools can identify that an
attack has begun when certain aspects of the victim’s system
become significantly more active [18]. In fact, in 2018 the
median time required for ransomware to encrypt an entire
file system was only 7.8 minutes [5]. The system behavior
observed may include frequency of file system access,
frequency of encryption, network connections, and which

OS functions are being called, all metrics that will be
characteristically affected by active ransomware [9]. When a
process begins acting suspicious an automated security tool
can terminate it immediately, preventing further damage
[18].
Behavioral analysis was the first researched detection
technique, pioneered in 2015 by Kharraz et al, and as such
has served as a foundational technique of ransomware
detection. Kharraz et al. closely studied how existing
ransomware manipulates the victim’s file system and
discovered that the system’s input and output requests could
be monitored to successfully detect an ongoing attack [19].
This discovery represented a major leap forward in defense
capabilities and researchers have been fine tuning the
technique ever since.
Later that year HelDroid was published, a security tool
that detects ransomware attacks on Android mobile phones
[36]. Rather than monitoring the file system for anomalous
behavior, HelDroid detects apps that are secretly attempting
to lock or encrypt the device [36]. Along with a robust
mobile device security tool capable of detecting unknown
ransomware samples with nearly zero false-positives, the
study also contained common characteristics of mobile
ransomware [36].
Another such tool is the Pre-Encryption Detection
Algorithm (PEDA) developed by Kok et al. and published
in 2020. PEDA builds upon previous detection and
prevention research to leverage a two layer detection system
capable of identifying known and unknown ransomware [9].
The behavioral analysis layer works using a machine
learning model trained on the OS function calls made by the
potential ransomware sample. All system calls are recorded
until a call to an encryption function is made, at which point
the list of extracted calls is fed into the machine learning
model to produce the prediction [9]. In order to collect the
system calls made without jeopardizing the user’s system,
PEDA executes the ransomware sample in a secure virtual
environment known as a sandbox. To accommodate this
paradigm users must manually submit a file to PEDA for
ransomware analysis. PEDA is a particularly advanced
detection tool capable of detecting ransomware without
requiring damage to the user’s files, but its general
effectiveness is limited by the high computing cost of
running a sandbox. PEDA boasts a 10-fold cross-validation
recall score of 99.9% proving to be a robust detection
system, but more importantly the study identified three
system calls used by most ransomware [9]. These three
system calls have certainly been incorporated into
ransomware models and will continue to inform defense
tool developers for years to come.
Ransomware attack detection is undeniably improving.
Not only can security tools detect attacks faster than ever
before, they can even recognize attacks from
never-before-seen ransomware samples [36]. In special
cases security tools can even detect ransomware without
risking system damage [9]. However, detection as a defense
paradigm is inherently reactive, which is not ideal because
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the victim must incur some system damage. Attack
detection is certainly helpful for minimizing losses and it’s
better than relying solely on recovery, but it still requires
that the ransomware infects the user’s system before
defenses are enacted. Detection tools essentially limit
damage, and they’ve been allowing less and less damage,
but can security tools entirely prevent attacks?
C. Prevention
Prevention is the newest approach to ransomware
defense, predicated on the goal of defeating ransomware
before it can even attack. There are many approaches to
ransomware prevention, ranging from technical prevention
to widespread user education to international law
enforcement. Cybersecurity researchers would love to be
able to prevent system damage aso they have found ways to
prevent infection and prevent encryption. Internet users
would love to be able to have peace of mind and not pay
ransoms therefore user education resources are plentiful.
Governments would love to minimize the financial burden
of criminal activity on their citizens so they have begun
targeting cybercriminal organizations and placing hefty
sanctions on ransomware strongholds. Recovery and
detection are invaluable in the domain of ransomware
defense, but prevention is the gold standard. Thankfully the
challenge of ransomware prevention is becoming
increasingly realistic and feasible.
Despite the successful development of reactive defense
tools, security researchers were aware that defense could
still be improved, so some set out to create a system that
operates proactively. Their solution was binary analysis, a
technique in which the contents of the code in a file are
searched for cryptographic operations and compared against
known ransomware. Recall that the code responsible for
ransomware behavior comes in the form of a binary file,
hence the name binary analysis.
In the previous section I discussed the detection layer of
PEDA, now I’ll discuss the prevention layer of PEDA.
PEDA implements binary analysis by first hashing the
binary, producing a hash signature. In cryptography hashing
is a mathematical one-way function that accepts a file and
produces a character signature unique to the file contents
[9]. The signature is then compared against a repository of
known ransomware signatures. A match here indicates the
file is a known ransomware, at which point the user is made
aware and the file is quarantined [9]. The binary analysis
layer executes prior to the detection layer because
identifying a known ransomware sample eliminates the need
to interpret the system calls, the attack has already been
prevented. If the hash isn’t recognized, and then the
detection layer classifies the file as ransomware, then the
signature is added to the repository of known ransomware
signatures. This self updating system helps to keep the
repository of known ransomware signatures current. Binary
analysis is fast and efficient, but lacks the ability to identify
unknown ransomwares and therefore cannot prevent their

attacks. However, since most ransomware attacks stem from
a small number of ransomware families, binary analysis
goes a long way towards preventing most attacks. Where
once users were completely vulnerable, we now have a
technique that can prevent damage from ransomware that’s
been seen before. This is a massive step in the right
direction, but emerging cybercriminal techniques such as
obfuscation of the binary may allow attacks to slip by
unprevented [18]. To counter this never ending battle
researchers continue to anticipate cybercriminal innovations
by developing innovations of their own.
Whereas binary analysis prevents a ransomware
infection, innovative methods continuously emerge that
prevent ransomware encryption. In 2019 a team of
researchers developed a novel method that prevents file
encryption by randomly and continuously changing file
extensions that the ransomware tries to encrypt [31]. The
authors refer to this as the Moving Target Defense method
and claim it can prevent encryption despite changes in
attack techniques because it provides protection at such a
fundamental level [31]. When tested against ransomware
samples from four families the tool was able to protect
important files from 99% of the samples, all while
maintaining a small computational footprint, meaning no
noticeable performance degradation [31]. The widespread
adoption of a tool this robust would put a huge dent in
ransomware attackers’ profits, and the development of such
a tool represents a positive trend in ransomware prevention.
Another example of prevention innovation is a tool
published in 2020 called NoCry which prevents encryption
by controlling which programs have access to OS
cryptography functions [18]. Rather than monitoring these
function calls and detecting suspicious encryption patterns,
NoCry only allows trustworthy programs to use the
functions necessary for encrypting files, taking the step from
detection to prevention using a similar technique. NoCry
was developed from a prior tool in the same paper called
UShallNotPass that leveraged the same prevention
technique, but when developing NoCry the author made
improvements to make the tool more secure, effective, and
efficient. Testing NoCry against hundreds of ransomware
samples yielded a 97% encryption prevention rate and
UShallNotPass even protected the system from NotPetya, a
feat no prior defense tool could accomplish [18]. By
iteratively improving prevention techniques and coming up
with creative approaches the problem of ransomware
encryption prevention can effectively be solved.
Luckily for security researchers they’re not the only
ones interested in defending against ransomware attacks,
governments and law enforcement agencies are finally
fighting too. For roughly the first decade of contemporary
ransomware’s existence law enforcement has been
disappointingly inactive, but it’s not entirely their fault.
Most law enforcement agencies operate within a geographic
region where they have jurisdiction, but since ransomware
attacks happen online and often originate in a different
geographic region than where users are victimized, attackers
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are beyond the reach of any single jurisdiction [7]. To make
matters even more difficult cybercriminals use
pseudo-anonymous payment methods and launder ransoms
through multiple geographic and legal jurisdictions so
tracking the money is difficult [7]. Thankfully, in 2018 a
groundbreaking paper was published that deanonymized
bitcoin laundering and presented a detailed examination of
the ransomware ecosystem from victim bitcoin purchase all
the way to attacker cash-out over a two year period [5].
Using a combination of real victims, intentional ransomware
infections, ransomware source code, network traffic, and a
large Bitcoin address database the research team learned that
ransomware operators tend to cash out ransoms at a Russian
bitcoin exchange called BTC-e [5]. In fact, 95% of all
ransomware payments made between the start of 2014 and
the middle of 2017 were converted to a fiat currency
through BTC-e [38]. Armed with this knowledge the
Northern District of California’s Department of Justice
investigated and charged the operator of BTC-e, 37 year old
Russian national Alexander Vinnik, with one count of
operation of an unlicensed money service business, one
count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, two
counts of engaging in unlawful monetary transactions, and
seventeen counts of money laundering [39]. In December of
2020 after multiple extraditions Vinnik was sentenced to
five years in a French prison [40]. The paper that exposed
Vinnik was the first of its kind, but after seeing the real
world impact that a Bitcoin audit can have I expect to see
more of this in the future.
Law enforcement efforts have gone beyond targeting
individual cybercriminals in recent months, indicating a
trend in the government's willingness to prevent
ransomware. On April 15th, 2021 President Joe Biden
signed an executive order placing economic sanctions on
Russia in response to their involvement in the SolarWinds
cyber attack [41]. The attack began in December of 2020
and took advantage of a weakness in the IT software
SolarWinds to compromise 18,000 customers, nine federal
agencies, and 100 private organizations [41]. While this
executive order is just a first step it represents a positive
trend for three main reasons. First, Biden’s administration
has made it clear that further cyber attacks are unacceptable
and it’s prepared to “impose substantial and lasting costs” if
cyber attacks continue. Second, this executive order grants
the US government additional powers it hasn’t had in the
past. Third, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
has stated its support for the executive order and “stands in
solidarity with the United States” [41]. Considering all of
these factors it’s evident that the US government, as well as
governments abroad, are equipping themselves to combat
ransomware that originates outside of their jurisdiction. By
taking action now governments are preventing future
ransomware attacks.
With the authority and resources of governmental
bodies ransomware defense capabilities leap forward, but ll,
there is still no substitution for effective user education as a
prevention method. Along with endpoint security,

cybersecurity experts cite user education as the most
important method of fighting ransomware [6]. Awareness,
behavior, and culture are considered the pillars of
cybersecurity and experts can strengthen these pillars by
disseminating their knowledge through training [23]. As
discussed earlier, phishing emails are one of the most
popular and effective attack vectors because they target the
weak link in the security chain, the human user [42].
Information Security Awareness Training (ISAT) can help
employees protect their organizations by not falling victim
to social engineering attacks such as phishing emails.
Implementing an effective ISAT program is not an easy task,
but there are extensive resources for ISAT at organizations’
disposal; successful programs tend to conduct routine
training year-round and identify the specific needs of the
organization [42]. Once an organization tries a few
approaches and figures out what works best for them the
program can mature allowing the organization to benefit
from an immense return on investment as their overall
security improves. A review of security literature has shown
significant organizational security improvements due to
behavior changes from ISAT programs [42]. Moving
forward, organizations are likely to invest in ISAT programs
because it is financially sensible, and that increasing
demand for effective ISAT will foster a strong security
industry and mature the overall defense ecosystem.
Ransomware awareness can still be improved without
the need for costly ISAT programs though. The
cybersecurity community has agreed on best practices for
organizations and individual users. Many of the
organizational practices require information security
administration and pertain to large interconnected systems,
but individual best practices are attainable for most Internet
users. From a review of the literature these are seven
security practices that you can implement to prevent
becoming a victim of a ransomware attack [7, 43, 44]:
● Regularly back up data offline and check on it.
Backups may be the best recovery method
● Since users are targeted focus on awareness of
ransomware and training on information security
principles and techniques
● Update the operating system, software, and
firmware, especially when vulnerabilities are
discovered
● Install anti-virus and anti-malware tools. Make sure
they scan regularly and update automatically
● Try not to open or reply to spam emails. Do not
click on links or open attachments unless you can
verify the sender
● Exercise caution when using a public Wi-Fi
network. Use network protection such as a Virtual
Private Network (VPN)
● Disable network file sharing and deactivate unused
wireless connection ports such as Bluetooth or
infrared
D. Defense Conclusion
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Ransomware defense effectiveness is trending upwards
across all three defense paradigms as increasing attention
and resources are devoted to them. For roughly fifteen years
security researchers had no choice but to react to attacks and
analyze their methods. But within the last few years
detailed, comprehensive models have finally become
available allowing security experts to work proactively and
improve reactive methods. Defenders wouldn’t have been
able to understand their adversary without behavioral
analysis laying the groundwork for developing attack
models with far reaching benefits, such as the effectiveness
of key escrow systems. Decoy file defenses are also getting
better at detecting attacks with minimal damage, and
research in this area has even outpaced real-world
ransomware threats. Still, file backups are perhaps the most
effective way to thwart ransomware, and attackers have few
options for countering this simple defense method.
Proactive defense is where efforts are primarily focused
now, and the methods emerging from this approach are the
key to turning the tides in the ransomware battle. Binary
analysis tools have the ability to prevent known ransomware
threats with no risk to the user’s system, and new tools
using novel methods can even outperform that. NoCry
controls access to the system’s encryption functions to
defeat unknown ransomware threats and the Moving Target
Defense methods continuously changes file extensions to
achieve the same outcome. New and innovative security
tools such as these are published every year that build upon
recent research, meaning that defense progress is
accelerating. For example, PEDA combines two defense
techniques to create a multilayered, self-updating security
tool. What will next year’s cybersecurity journals bring?
Aside from technical solutions to prevent ransomware
the cybersecurity community has learned how to map and
expose the cybercriminal black market, allowing the US
government to step in and perform its newfound
anti-ransomware duties. Ever improving ISAT programs are
enabling stronger protection for organizations and will
continue to mature as more organizational customers adopt
this preventative measure. In the neverending battle against
ransomware best practices and defense tools are the shield,
and law enforcement is the sword.

VII. CONCLUSION

Ransomware will probably never disappear entirely, but
with dedicated defense efforts it can be mitigated until it
hardly remains. Over time attackers have shifted which
users they target, which systems they target, and how they
infect victims. New and creative attack methods will always
be emerging, but defenders are getting better at
understanding and mitigating their threat. Every approach to
ransomware defense, recovery, detection, and especially
prevention, has seen promising development in recent years.
Defenders will continue to refine attack models and
implement tools based on that understanding, until
eventually attacking is no longer worth the risk or cost, and
then ransomware’s threat will be diminished.
Realistically, the threat of ransomware may need to get
worse before it can get better. Whenever attackers
successfully collect a ransom payment they’re also sowing
the seeds of their own demise because they’re incentivizing
stronger defenses. Even money lost from damage to infected
computer systems, that ransomware attackers never receive,
is mounting motivation for Internet users to invest the
resources necessary in ransomware defense. Every dollar of
damage that ransomware attackers inflict increases the
target on their back.
In response to the demand for ransomware defense
academic researchers and private cybersecurity firms,
alongside massive law enforcement resources, have begun
to turn the tide. Preventative methods will enable defenders
to overtake attack progress in the future. Surely there will be
seen and unforeseen challenges, but as time goes on the
collaborative nature of defense research will overpower the
competitive nature of attack. Ultimately attack innovations
are motivated by profit, therefore ransomware developers
are always in anonymous competition with one another.
Even collaborative cybercriminal schemes like Ransomware
as a Service will soon be dismantled by defender’s new
ability to track payments. Conversely, defenders accumulate
their knowledge and share it because they’re united by a
common enemy. That’s why defense will continue to
accelerate until ransomware attacking isn’t worth the risk or
cost anymore. It’s a war of attrition and at that point
cybercriminals will move on to the next best profitable
crime fad, and then ransomware’s threat will be diminished.
I don’t expect it to disappear entirely, but it will be relegated
to niche attacks, only a shell of what the ransomware crime
wave once was.
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